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What was the programme theory of New Labour’s Health System Reforms? 
Ross Millar, Martin Powell and Anna Dixon 
Introduction 
International health care reforms vary over time and space. Toth claims that there have been 
distinct and sometimes opposing waves of reform over the last 20 years, characterized from 
competition to cooperation and back. Countries have different starting points and reform 
journeys. Between 1997 and 2010 the UK Labour government produced an ambitious programme 
of reform for the English National Health Service (NHS). It composed many different elements, 
with policy reforms being layered to form a complex temporal path.  
In this paper, we focus on the Health System Reforms as set out in Health reform in England 
Update and Next Steps, which can be seen as part of Toth's third wave reforms that focus on 
patient rights through choice and competition. The Health System Reforms were part of an 
evolving system that wove existing policies together and sought to incorporate future policies into 
the NHS. In short, it was a reform programme rather than a single event that set out the direction 
and momentum of reform but also established strong processes for identifying any unintended 
consequences, feeding back lessons learned and, in turn, for adapting the reforms over time.  
The main aim of this paper is to examine whether the Health System Reforms in the English NHS 
delivered the promised ‘coherent and mutually supporting set of reforms’. This concern reflects a 
recent interest in ‘realist’ evaluation of health policy that is based on different ‘schools’ such as 
‘realistic’ evaluation and ‘theories of change’. We aim to identify the underlying ‘programme 
theory’ and context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations of the Health System Reforms.  
The various realist approaches start from the viewpoint that while experimental logic can claim 
the programme a ‘success’, we actually learn nothing about why it works. In paying attention to 
know how and why a programme works, evaluators of programme theory concern themselves 
with questions about the internal structure of programmes. They argue that social programmes 
are based upon explicit or implicit theories about how and why the programme will work. The task 
of evaluation is to surface those theories, identify the key assumptions and test their validity. 
In a report of 75 pages Coleman et al. use programme theory to examine practice-based 
commissioning (PBC). However, PBC constitutes one policy within one of the four streams of the 
Health System Reforms. Consequently, due to space constraints, we identify rather than test 
programme theory. Similar to Pawson and Tilley who present ‘a history of evaluation in 28 1/2 
pages’, we draw on documentary analysis and interviews with key policy-makers to present a 
programme theory of the Health System Reforms in nine pages.  
The Health System Reforms 
Health reform in England: update and next steps describes how the reform programme was 
intended to work together. This system reform programme (Figure 1) represents four related 
streams (demand, supply, transactional and system management reforms) which are described as 
‘a coherent and mutually supporting set of reforms, which together provide systems and 
incentives to drive improvements in health and health services, increase responsiveness to 















Figure 1 Framework for health reform in England 
The Health System Reforms aimed to achieve ‘the right balance of incentives, patient choice, 
plurality and transparency in the system’. In doing so it intended to make the ‘patient's voice and 
choice heard’ and give clinicians and managers the ‘tools’ to make good use of resources and to 
respond flexibly to their patients and population. 
We aim to critically examine this balance in two main ways. First, what was the ‘fit’ of the 
streams? Were the reforms a ‘post hoc rationalization’? Were they unbalanced in the sense of one 
stream dominating the others? Second, what was the ‘fit’ over time? It is possible to map the four 
reform streams presented in Figure 1 onto earlier and later documents. We will also examine 
whether there were unintended consequences, lessons learned and policy adaption over time.  
Programme theory and CMO configurations 
Pawson and Tilley set out some basic guidance about programme theory and CMO configurations. 
Theories must be framed in terms of propositions about how mechanisms (M) are fired in contexts 
(C) to produce outcomes (O): what might work for whom in what circumstances. In other words, 
the relationship between causal mechanisms and their effects is contingent rather than fixed. They 
present an example of realism in the car park with eight mechanisms and six contexts. They stress 
that there is nothing about CCTV in car parks which intrinsically inhibits car crime. CCTV must work 
by instigating a chain of reasoning and reaction. Put another way, we need a theory, which relates 
to human choices and capabilities, of why CCTV may be effective. They later argue that the 
policy-maker's account has a rather specific significance as a source of testable theory, which takes 
the form of CMO configurations.  
Methods 
Our aim is to surface and refine the programme theory of Health System Reforms through a 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with policy-makers. Documentary analysis 
examined the policy assumptions contained in the Health System Reforms programme. This 
carried out a micro level textual analysis that aimed to surface the implicit and explicit programme 
theories about how the reforms intended to achieve its goals and outcomes. Detailed analysis of 
the Health reform in England document examined the way in which the reforms were pulled 
together. Essentially, this looked to trace the reform journey to highlight the causal assumptions 
underpinning the Health System Reforms. In particular, the analysis aimed to tease the 
connections or linkages between the reforms and discuss how the reform streams fit together 
within the overall programme theory. This analysis culminated into causal maps as presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.  
In support of the documentary analysis in understanding programme theory we carried out 
interviews with policy-makers involved in the formulation of the Health System Reforms 
programme. These interviews with eight policy-makers aimed to further understand the 
programme theory in policy documents. These interviewees were selected and recruited as 
individuals having a direct involvement in the policy-making process during the period from the 
NHS Plan onwards. They held different positions and were in post for different periods of time but 
had all contributed to the Health System Reforms programme. The interviews took place in 
between May and September 2009.  
Within each interview we asked for their particular perspective on the formulation and interaction 
of the reform streams. Interviews asked for their reflections on the process, the intended and 
unintended outcomes of the policy and the contextual drivers that led to the arrival of the Health 
System Reforms diagram. Data analysis of the interviews looked to gather and present evidence 
on whether policy-maker perspectives supported the Health System Reforms programme theory.  
 Figure 2 Mapping the programme theory of Health System Reforms 
 Figure 3 The patient benefits associated with Health System Reforms 
Results 
This section presents the programme theories and CMO configurations underpinning each of the 
four reform streams, and then moves to examine the interactions between the streams. The 
mechanisms are the policies within the four streams. There is little explicit discussion of context, 
which suggests that it is assumed that mechanisms will work for all in different situations. In other 
words, it seems to be assumed that mechanisms are universalistic rather than contingent. The 
Health reform in England document points out that most work to date on the reform programme 
has addressed the acute and hospital care sector, but the introduction of new incentives will 
enable health care professionals and NHS managers to better respond to the needs and 
preferences of their patients. It continues that in early 2006, a White Paper (following the Your 
Health, Your Care, Your Say consultation) will set out both a strategic vision for health and health 
care services in the community. These new incentives and flexibilities will be used to support 
‘better quality and more responsive and patient-focused services in primary and community 
settings’. Similarly, the Health System Reforms programme will also act as a key driver to deliver 
the vision for the future of community services. There is no explicit discussion about whether the 
reforms are expected to operate in different settings such as urban and rural areas, where levels 
of choice and competition can vary significantly. 
It is difficult to pin down the aims or stated outcomes of the reforms. The Health System Reforms 
diagram (Figure 1) lists the rather vague outcomes of ‘better care; better patient experience; and 
better value for money’. Later, it is claimed that the programme will ‘drive improvements in health 
and health services, increase responsiveness to patients and help to achieve reductions in health 
inequalities’. Moreover, the intended outcomes are ‘better-quality patient services and improved 
value for taxpayers’ money. In Appendix A, aims are laid out for the individual streams: to create 
more knowledgeable, assertive and influential users of services (demand); to create more flexible, 
responsive and innovative service providers (supply); to ensure that the impact of patients' choice 
is understood, and that good provider response is rewarded (transactional); and to ensure safety 
and to safeguard core standards in all services and to provide a transparent, rules-based 
framework for key management and decision-making functions in a more dynamic system (system 
management and regulation).  
Demand side reform 
Demand side reform is composed of choice, voice and commissioning elements It is claimed that 
achieving the outcomes of better care, better patient experience and better value for money 
would be achieved through levers and incentives that ‘create more knowledgeable, assertive and 
influential users of services’ (p. 3). In other words, more information will contribute to more 
empowered patients who will drive service improvement through both choice and voice. The 
creation of a commissioning framework that included PBC will provide the necessary ‘tools’ to 
innovate, and influence local service development . The cumulative effect of commissioning 
reform will increase the focus on moving to care into primary and community settings. PBC, in 
particular, would provide a lever in shifting health care spending towards preventative services 
delivering better health outcomes. Despite repeated emphases on innovation and responsiveness, 
the precise causal links are never spelled out. While it is clear that providers must be responsive to 
customers in a competitive market, it is unclear whether the ‘customers’ are largely PCT or 
individual ‘patient-choosers’, nor is it clear on what basis customers make their choices. Moreover, 
the claim that PBC would be a major driver for preventive services and community settings 
appears rather optimistic.  
There was recognition among our policy interviewees that the choice policy had developed over 
time from a means to tackle waiting times to something that was more powerful as a driver for 
competition. Some informants stressed that not all consumers had to choose in order for the 
policy to work. In short, contestability or the perceived threat of competition may be more 
important than the level of actual competition.  
We never needed much by the way of patient choice to create these kind of incentive 
effects, we didn't need every patient going through some massive rational cost benefit 
analysis. We needed the threat of choice (P1).  
You didn't need that many patients to actually switch as long as it was a credible enough 
threat that would produce some kind of behavioural effect on the part of the hospitals and 
surgeons (P4). 
Concerns about applying an ‘urban’ solution to ‘rural’ areas were not given great weight.  
There are concerns about rural areas, but only about 10% of Britain is rural, so actually 
there was always this great danger of letting the rural tail wagging the urban dog (P1).  
There is a view that we live on a small island with densely populated areas and therefore 
choice and competition could become a reality for 80% of the population. The fact that you 
couldn't make it work in Cumbria or rural East Anglia or Cornwall was not an argument for 
failing to apply those principles for the majority of the population (P5). 
In relation to commissioning reform, it was broadly agreed that commissioning had developed 
more slowly and was weaker than the supply side. There were some concerns over the capacity of 
PCTs as commissioners, partly due to reasons of structure, personnel and potential destabilization. 
In general there was a sense of disappointment and by 2003 a realization that changes were 
needed, with the introduction of PBC in 2005. On the one hand, PBC was seen as a form of 
continuation of GP fundholding and as a method of demand management. However, PBC was also 
perceived as a weak link in contributing to the reform programme.  
I found a weak spot in the set-up was commissioning… I think the people that introduced 
them hoped that PCTs were going to have the best of health authorities and the best of GP 
fundholding, you know, they were in a sense GP-led health authorities. Actually I think they 
had the worst of both. They weren't big enough to really deal properly with the big trusts, 
the big hospital trusts, and they weren't small enough to play the market in the way the GP 
fundholders had, and they didn't really mobilize the GPs again in the way the GP 
fundholders had, they became another bureaucracy and so on and so on. So I was very 
keen to try and reintroduce GP fundholding, and indeed did, sort of, with PBC (P1). 
Supply side reform 
The introduction of supply side reform aimed to create more ‘flexible, responsive and innovative 
service providers’ in order to achieve the outcomes of better care, better patient experience and 
better value for money. Of particular note, the freedom and flexibilities of foundation trust (FT) 
status gives front-line healthcare professionals and local managers the incentive to improve 
services and innovate in response to the needs of their patients and local populations. The 
diversification of providers with the introduction of private and third sector providers would 
generate more capacity, innovation and new ways of working. Within this, the development of a 
wider range of primary and community services will provide ‘new and innovative models of care’. 
Alongside ‘diverse providers’, workforce reform aimed to introduce more flexible working 
practices leading to changes in practice and culture (p.10). The assumptions here appear to be 
private and third sector providers are more innovative, and can force their NHS competitors to 
innovate. Moreover, it appears to be assumed that greater freedoms will automatically lead to 
greater innovation.  
The need for greater plurality of providers was seen an important component of the reforms. One 
reason was to increase capacity to reduce public and private waiting lists but also through FTs to 
give successful NHS providers greater autonomy. However, there were some different views on 
FTs from our interviewees:  
The freeing up of FT from the dead hand of the state was a perfectly rational thing to do. 
The supply side reforms needed more diversity within the NHS (P8).  
I got very hooked on constructing an organizational form for public services which could 
not be bought by the private sector and which would not distribute shareholder profit (P2).  
We needed autonomous public providers, but the worry I had about FT is that they would 
be accountable in too many different directions (P1). 
The introduction of independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs) through a first wave of centrally 
commissioned contracts was seen as a means of increasing capacity and challenging the NHS. 
Despite this, the initial policy ambitions were scaled back before the policy had got off the ground.  
I would like to have seen more use of the independent sector [problems over the ISTC 
programme] (P1). 
Transactional reform 
The goal of the transactional reform stream is essentially to link the supply and demand reforms; 
to ‘ensure that the impact of patient choice is understood and good provider response is 
rewarded’. Combined with patient choice and better information for patients, payment by results 
(PbR) will bring greater financial transparency to the system. It will benefit ‘respected and 
productive services’, and provide incentives to improve for those ‘providers struggling on quality 
or cost control’. PbR also provides incentives for the development of alternative primary and 
community services where these are more clinically effective and cost effective than 
hospitalization. In addition, more and better clinical and management information will enable 
providers to understand and respond to patients' needs. Practices and PCTs will use such 
information to drive commissioning decisions to align services with population needs. Better 
information will also help practices, PCTs and regulators to track quality and performance (p. 11).  
PbR replaced block contracts with payment for activity. It was seen as a key driver of competition 
for creating incentives to reduce waiting lists:  
Money following the patient as the vehicle for driving competition (P3). 
However, it was recognized that tariffs needed to be refined to ensure that they did not simply 
lead to greater secondary activity:  
The decision to have fixed prices was in part recognition of weak commissioners and was 
expected to drive technical efficiency within the acute sector. However the original tariff 
was a beta release 0.1. Patricia Hewitt in a speech to the NHS Confederation in about June 
2005 said that the tariff needed to be reformed. She talked about creating a tariff based on 
best practice and a tariff that incentivised care outside of hospitals and so even at that 
point we were clear the tariff was not fit for the long term purpose (P8). 
System management reform 
The elements of system management reform (SMR) are given as governance; standards; licensing 
providers; competition policy; performance regime; and setting prices. SMR aims to create a 
framework of levers and incentives to ensure safety, standards and transparency. Here, the Health 
reform in England document suggests performance management and regulatory functions would 
achieve this goal through the creation of ‘standards and monitoring compliance’ (p.11). Processes 
for ensuring quality, licensing providers and price setting created a framework that promoted 
competition but protected essential services. The goal of system management would also be 
achieved with a wider view of regulation. Connections are made here with transactional reform as 
the new regulatory system combined with NHS tariff to create incentives for improving services, 
health care outcomes and increasing productivity.  
Among those we spoke to there was little recognition that the system of targets and performance 
management continued to co-exist alongside the market reforms or about the role of SHAs in 
wider system management. The main focus was on the creation of independent regulators to 
assure patients of quality and safety and to have greater transparency about the quality of care.  
Patients should not be choosing between good and bad services, but should be safe and 
appropriate …. In the same ways that when you buy house you should be able to take it as 
a given that it is not going to fall on you (P8). 
Interactions between the streams 
The Health reform in England document stresses the importance of interactions between the 
streams at many points. For example, this gradual introduction of incentives and flexibilities within 
a context of ‘system rules’ will build the momentum needed to deliver more benefits for patients 
and taxpayers. Better and more responsive services will be driven by the combined effect of more 
information on quality, patients exercising choice on the basis of such information and advice, and 
money following the patient. The combination of PBC and better commissioning by practices and 
PCTs will make it easier to invest in local services. A clear rules-based system will provide 
confidence for patients, and will encourage innovation as providers understand the rewards and 
risks (p. 12). Figure 2 presents the results of analysis of Chapter 3 of the Health System Reforms 
document that maps the causal assumptions underpinning the Health System Reforms approach.  
However, programme theory is often far from clear. As noted above, the broad high level 
outcomes are listed, but it is difficult to determine the precise causal linkages. Moreover, analysis 
of the ‘Benefits for Patients’ appears to give a rather different picture (Figure 3). If we link the 
goals with mechanisms, we find that mechanisms appear to be heavily skewed towards the 
demand side.  
Above all, incentives appear to be the key mechanism of the reforms, but ‘choice’ seems to be 
more important than ‘voice’. A very crude content analysis of the document gives the following 
counts: choice (52); information (45); incentives (26); and voice (8). All of the reforms are 
designed, in different ways, to introduce more incentives for hospitals and commissioners to fulfil 
patients' expectations and, crucially, more incentives for those who are not meeting patients' 
expectations to improve (p. 13).  
The ‘programme theory’ of policy-makers suggested that the Health System Reforms programme 
was an attempt to make sense of the various elements of the reform agenda and how they fitted 
together. Crucially this was in part to satisfy a new ministerial team as there ‘wasn't a good 
understanding of how things were meant to fit together’ (P7). Clarity and coherence for the new 
Secretary of State (Patricia Hewitt) was needed.  
With the new Secretary of State, the department was struggling to create a narrative to 
explain what the health reforms were set out to do (P8).  
There was a ‘new Secretary of State and Minister of State … asking how does all this work 
and why and nobody was really able to explain it’ (P3). 
One informant was able to articulate the link between the specific reform mechanisms and the 
outcomes though this was seen to be problematic:  
Choice was the primary driver for a better patient experience, regulation as a primary 
driver for better quality; tariff as a primary driver for better value for money. So they 
operated an interlinked set but some of them were more important in certain aspects (P8). 
There was a sense that the means had sometimes been elevated above the ends (P3). While ends 
were drawn from what would have been the department's key outcomes from time immemorial 
(P7), it was generally considered that the main target was the 18 week wait.  
Reducing waiting times was THE focus, that was the overriding policy objective (P5). 
Some interviewees expressed the view that the ‘fit’ between the streams was not fully clear, and 
that they were unbalanced to some extent.  
I still think that the system architecture is correct. I just think that we're using Windows 3 
when everybody else has moved onto Vista (P8). 
Some predictable but unwanted outcomes were also identified, including the expenditure growth 
associated with the strength of providers and the incentives from PbR.  
Powerful providers who were getting their income from fee for service and so had a very 
strong incentive to try and hoover up as much activity as possible. Unless you had a strong 
instrument for managing demand you got a classic recipe for, in a few years time, massive 
cost inflation (P1).  
Proper checks and balances were not as strong as they need to be. For example, PbR gives 
incentives on providers to get more activity through (P7).  
It was recognized that PbR acted as a barrier to moving care outside the hospital. the tariff 
was a blockage to moving money outside of hospital (P8). 
Moreover, some views were expressed about the validity of policies beyond elective conditions.  
[I]t was designed really around elective surgery I think; designed really for the hospital 
services surgery. … I don't think that we have fully completed the jigsaw of what the right 
blend of policy mechanism has been for different pathways. We … need to think about how 
you get the right mix of mechanisms for different pathways in different places (P3). 
When asked about the interactions between the levers, informants recognized that there were 
tensions and that some areas of reform had been stronger and been given greater attention.  
There is a real risk in uneven or very differently paced developments. My perception was 
that supply side reforms had been more advanced and were picked up more quickly that 
the demand side, which would have been reversed in an ideal world (P7). 
The system was originally unbalanced when it was designed but it did not matter as the first 
generation of reforms were created in the context of long waiting lists. As it became successful it 
made itself out of date. To use the interviewer's weights example: ‘the ballast was right but as you 
were unloading the cargo you needed to change the ballast’ (P8). 
We have to ask it is the package of reforms that are fit for purpose rather than individual 
items. For example [name] has spoken many times that the failures of FT may be the 
failures of commissioning rather than the failures of FT per se (P5). 
On balance looking across the reforms the informants we spoke to felt that the supply side 
reforms had been pursued at the expense of the demand side reforms and that in terms of order, 
more attention should have been paid to commissioning in the early phases of reform.  
[I]f I knew where they were going to end up I wouldn't have started by doing FT. So quite a 
lot of phase 2 reforms were designed to catch up on the commissioning side (P8).  
One of the well rehearsed criticisms is that one should have sorted out commissioning 
before doing any of the supply side stuff. In the abstract one can see the attractions of that 
argument. In practice there are a series of political problematics… and the first was around 
waiting times (P4). 
Discussion 
A number of points emerge from the analysis of documents and interviews. First, programme 
theory was not fully clear. While the programme appeared to fit together at the macro level, this 
was less obvious for micro level linkages. In particular, there was a tendency to claim that 
individual streams led to global outcomes rather than considering how different streams might 
lead to conflicting outcomes. For example, unreformed PbR might lead to greater secondary 
activity and undermine ‘care closer to home’. Some dogs did not bark. For example, there was 
little discussion of voice or workforce reform, and little consideration of how the reforms might 
lead to the reduction of health inequalities. While the comments of our interviewees were more 
nuanced and filled in some of the gaps in the document, this did not make programme theory fully 
clear. In short, there is little explanation of ‘fit’ beyond the diagram. It remains unclear why there 
are four streams rather than, say, three or five. There are few clues as to how the mechanisms fit 
with each other or with the outcomes.  
Second, there was generally little recognition of context in the document, although more 
recognition among our interviewees. However, in there was a broad assumption of universalistic 
rather than contingent mechanisms. For example, there was little recognition of the differences 
between acute and community care settings. In other words, it was assumed that ‘one size fits all’ 
with little recognition that some contexts would be more receptive than others. 
Third, there was some policy evolution, and rebalancing between the streams. Some later policy 
levers were added or changed as problems emerged. For example, it became clear that PbR was 
more accurately viewed as ‘payment by activity’. This led to discussions of ‘best practice’ and 
‘unbundled’ tariffs that linked payment partly to quality, patient experience and patient 
satisfaction rather than simply to quantity. Policy-makers were also aware of other perverse 
incentives and unforeseen consequences. They attempted to pull the appropriate policy levers 
with some later elements aiming to restore balance to system, for example, PBC to balance PbR, 
and World Class Commissioning to challenge the dominance of FTs.  
Conclusion 
The main conclusion of this paper is that it is difficult to develop ‘programme theory’ for the 
Health System Reforms beyond the fairly general level of the diagram. It is particularly difficult to 
detect a CMO configuration at the micro level. We have found the linkages between M and O 
unclear with little explicit recognition of C. The reforms do not appear to comprise a coherent and 
mutually supportive set of arrangements, and appear ‘unbalanced’ in that the ‘centre of gravity’ 
favours suppliers over commissioners. However, recent reform changes have sought to redress 
this imbalance to some extent, suggesting that lessons have been learned and policies have been 
adapted over time. It remains unclear whether the 2010 Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government plan for the NHS represents evolution or revolution in health care reform. Like the 
Health System Reforms, it is also stated that the reform proposals ‘are interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing’, and it claims that ‘levers’ and ‘incentives’ will lead to certain outcomes e.g. a 
new system of economic regulation will promote financial discipline, efficiency, transparency and 
fairness in the way that resources are used (para 7.28). Moreover, in the language of programme 
theory, we have seen some changes in context, mechanism and (intended) outcomes. For 
example, strengthening the local authority role as integrator of commissioning across the NHS, 
public health and social care will deliver more integrated care, improve efficiency and offer better 
user experience. The development of economic regulation will strengthen the drive for provider 
efficiency through greater price transparency, increased competition, and a clear and independent 
provider failure regime.  
The implications of our findings suggest that drawing attention to such programme theory 
configurations is important in three ways. First, simply linking all of the reform streams to global 
outcomes, such as improved health, is insufficient. Greater and more specific CMOs for individual 
policies and streams are required. Second, more attention needs to be paid to the interactions 
between the various reform policies as some tensions were clearly evident. Third, greater 
consideration of context is required. What works for urban areas and elective conditions may not 
work for rural areas and long-term conditions. Reformers need to understand that healthcare 
systems are like complex and fragile ecosystems: changes to one area may trigger changes in other 
areas. By paying attention to the programme theory of health care reform, we hope to shed light 
of these implicit and explicit assumptions. In doing so, we provide a map from which to navigate 
through the complexity of reform policy, illuminating casual links and intended and unintended 
consequences.  
Acknowledgements 
This paper draws on independent research commissioned and funded by the Policy Research 
Programme in the Department of Health. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the 
Department.  
References 
Toth F. Healthcare policies over the last 20 years: Reforms and counter-reforms. Health Policy 
2010;95:82–89 
Hacker JS. Dismantling the Health Care State? Political Institutions, Public Policies and the 
Comparative Politics of Health Reform'. British Journal of Political Science 2004;34:693–724 
Ham C. Health Policy in Britain. 6th edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009 
Klein R. The New Politics of the NHS, 6th edn. Abingdon: Radcliffe Publishing, 2010 
Department of Health. Health reform in England: update and next steps. London: The Stationery 
Office, 2005 
Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission. Is the Treatment Working? London: Audit 
Commission, 2008 
Greener I, Mannion R. A realistic evaluation of practice-based commissioning. Policy and Politics 
2008;37:57–73 
Coleman A, Checkland K, Harrison S, Dowswell G. Practice-based Commissioning: theory, 
implementation and outcome: Final report. Manchester: NPCRDC, Manchester University, 2009 
Judge K, Bauld L. Strong theory, flexible methods: evaluating complex community based initiatives. 
Critical Public Health 2001;11:19–38 
Blamey A, Mackenzie M. Theories of Change and Realistic Evaluation: Peas in a Pod or Apples and 
Oranges? Evaluation 2007;13:439–55 
Pawson R, Tilley N. Realistic Evaluation, London: Sage, 1997 
Powell M, Millar R, Mulla A, et al. Comparative case studies of health reform in England: Final 
Report. London: Department of Health Policy Research Programme, 2011. Available at: 
http://hrep.lshtm.ac.uk/publications/Comparative_powell.pdf (last accessed 29 September 2011) 
Department of Health. The NHS Plan. London: The Stationery Office, 2000 
Dixon A, Robertson R, Appleby J, et al. Patient choice: how patients choose and how providers 
respond. London: King's Fund, 2010 
Pettigrew AM, Ferlie E, McKee L. Shaping Strategic Choice. London: Sage, 1992 
Department of Health. High Care Quality for All. The Stationary Office: London, 2009 
Department of Health. Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS. London: The Stationery Office, 
2010 
 
